The Decision to Use Force

President Trump must make the case to the American people, either before or after execution, that Iran maintains or maintained the capability to make a nuclear weapon in short order and is or was more than ever inclined to use it if the decision to commit offensive U.S. forces is made or executed. The DNI’s all source analysis should support this conclusion. Such analysis should include Iran’s threat spectrum, from use of a dirty bomb to nuclear explosive weaponization, the closure of the straights of Hormuz, a resurgence of proxy forces and an ongoing threat to our strategic ally Israel. Such proxy force analysis should include not only foreign but U.S. domestic cells and known Iranian attempts and/or plans to assassinate the president as reported by Senator Cruz. The imminent nature of the threat to the U.S. and U.S. national vital interests must be clear. Additionally, the use of force must be proportional to the threat and not risk, if at all possible consistent with mission success, use of nuclear bunker buster munitions, even if that entails higher risk, such risk measured in terms of executing force casualties, not mission success. Should U.S. restraint in limiting offensive actions to the destruction of Iran’s nuclear capabilities be met with direct attacks on the U.S. or U.S. forces, the implications should be made explicit. In regards to U.S. direct or supporting actions, the restrictions of EO 12333 apply unless and until modified.